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Health Reform and the Medicaid Expansion: 
Planning for Tennessee’s Fiscal Future
Allison Thigpen 
Advisor: Michael Fitzgerald
College scholars program, University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
In March 2010, Congress approved large changes for the health care indus-
try, including an expansion of the existing Medicaid program. This paper ex-
plores the potential fiscal impacts of this Medicaid expansion for the state of 
Tennessee. First, the development of Medicaid and TennCare, the current re-
cession, and the broader health reform law are outlined to contextualize the 
Medicaid expansion. Second, the population to be covered by the expansion 
is characterized to understand cost implication and reveal strategies for cost 
containment and health improvement. Next, the costs of the program are esti-
mated under set assumptions and the strength of the impact of two main vari-
ables – inflation and enrollment – are analyzed. Additionally, this section looks 
at savings the state may realize as well as some corollary consequences of the 
increased federal funding to the state.
Introduction
Spring 2010 in D.C. saw both the bloom of cherry blossoms and the passage of the first 
national bills that address the entirety of the American health system. Rife with political 
contention and questionable negotiations, the past year of debate was intensely emotional. 
Facts about the legislation were often misconstrued amidst framing of the many issues 
involved in the debates. even now after its passage, many groups and politicians continue 
to fight both the legislation as a whole and individual provisions within the bills. At the 
same time, administrators in all levels of government and throughout the private sector are 
expected to prudently implement the bill.
The purpose of this report is to aid in this implementation by exploring the costs and 
factors involved in the Medicaid expansion. The aim is objectivity in considering how these 
portions of the bill will unfold on the ground. As such, facts are blatantly presented; these 
goals are expensive. Their effectiveness, however, will be determined in the coming years.
http://trace.tennessee.edu/pursuit
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in light of the recent passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and 
the health Care and education Reconciliation Act (subsequently referred to collectively as 
ppACA) as well as the lack of Tennessee-based analysis, my paper focuses on interactions 
between the new law and Tennessee operations, including the budget and current policies 
on Medicaid and children’s coverage. i attempt to characterize how health reform may af-
fect Tennessee government by comparing analysis of the bills, national and state data on 
budget and health indicators, and analysis of state programs and policies. By comparing, 
combining, and analyzing information from these sources, a picture of the fiscal impact 
begins to emerge. 
Many factors will alter the course of the Medicaid program in the future; this paper 
highlights major unknowns that administrators should consider and account for in plan-
ning. since Tennessee has unique public programs and legislation regarding insurance 
regulation, federal reforms will impact Tennessee in distinctive ways. 
in the coming years and months, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid services 
(CMS) and the Tennessee Office of Finance and Administration will release their own 
analysis that will include more comprehensive information on implementation. My goal 
is to inform the numbers with history and an understanding of the expansion population. 
i make no attempts to be exhaustive in my work but rather to add to existing discourse.
part 1 explores the context of the Medicaid expansion, including the development 
of Medicaid and TennCare, the current recession, and the broader health reform law. part 2 
explores an estimated net cost of $2.3 billion. First, i work to characterize the population to 
be covered by the expansion. While the ultimate goal of this exercise is to understand the 
impacts on the cost of the program, it reveals several strategies for cost containment and 
health improvement. second, i broadly estimate the costs of the program under set assump-
tions. Finally, I analyze the strength of the impact of two main variables – inflation and 
enrollment. Moreover, this section looks at savings the state may realize as well as some 
corollary consequences of the increased federal funding to the state. 
Part 1: Context
The context of this Medicaid expansion is crucially important. Medicaid has been expand-
ed numerous times in the past, but events do not occur in vacuums. Current economic and 
political situations differ at this moment. Accordingly, in this section, i outline the history 
of Medicaid and TennCare, look at the current structure of TennCare, and explore the goals 
and provisions of health reform as a whole.
TennCare History
Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it. 
—george Santayana1
Beginning of Medicaid
Medicaid and Medicare, passed under the social security Amendments of 1965, provided 
health insurance for the elderly, the poor, the blind, and the disabled. While both are entitle-
ment programs, unlike the categorical state Children’s health insurance program, these 
two programs differ in several key ways. First, Medicare provides coverage for elderly 
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Americans; Medicaid provides care for the poor. second, Medicare is operated from the 
federal level while Medicaid, which does receive federal funding, is administered at the 
state level. Third, each program was designed for a different purpose. Medicare was deemed 
necessary because the “elderly had unique health needs which could never be addressed by 
the private sector, and thus required specific government remedy.”2 in contrast, Medicaid 
worked in conjunction with other period initiatives to fight the “War on Poverty.” Unlike 
its cousin, Medicaid “drew little opposition from organized medicine” since the program 
was seen as a “mere expansion of existing welfare programs.”3 
Within five years of the creation of the Medicaid, all states – except Arizona – es-
tablished Medicaid programs to expand care to the population targeted by the new pro-
gram.4 They covered a portion of the poor, as well as the blind and the disabled. eligibility 
was based on welfare guidelines already in place under Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC, now Temporary Assistance for needy Families, TAnF) and administered 
through existing state welfare departments.5 in the beginning, Medicaid “effectively pro-
hibited” cost-sharing, deductibles, and co-payments.6 By providing health insurance for the 
disenfranchised, program planners wanted to make care from private providers accessible 
to all patients, who up to this point had been treated in public clinics and hospitals. The 
program aimed to merge a two-tiered medical care system.
Medicaid was only one part of the Johnson Administration’s War on poverty which 
created programs that ranged from youth and work training to neighborhood health centers. 
This “three-pronged approach drew on research indicating that the poor were dispropor-
tionately undereducated, undertrained, sick, ignorant, and isolated.”7 still, the attack on 
medical disparities did not follow the general community-focused theme of other poverty 
programs because of political pressures. instead, Medicaid left the traditional private in-
frastructure in place without addressing the design and coordination of the medical and 
hospital systems. According to liberals at the time, “federal policy overemphasized hospi-
tal constructing, while ambulatory care was neglected.”8 in other words, Medicaid policy 
continued the emphasis on hospital care set in 1946 with the hill-Burton Act that funded 
hospital construction.9 
As such, Medicaid worked to integrate the low-income population into mainstream 
private hospitals that provided a higher quality of care than public clinics. since the pro-
gram needed to change the way this population received care, administrators had difficul-
ties enrolling those eligible in the program.10 in addition, states saw almost immediate 
budget problems from their generous hospital-based programs and began scaling back.
Two lessons can be gleaned from the early Medicaid years that are important when 
considering what methods will contain health costs. First, simply expanding coverage does 
not solve all problems in the health system and specifically does not help combat rising 
costs. Second, cost issues are compounded by undue emphasis on the benefits of hospital 
and acute care. 
Medicaid Expansions in the 1980s 
Medicaid enrollment has ebbed and flowed over the past two decades. Expansions in the 
late 1980s, however, put much financial stress on states, which in addition to failed national 
reforms in 1993 caused many of the state-level reforms seen in the ‘90s, including the 
TennCare waiver, to fail. Table 1.1 identifies both federal and Tennessee cuts and expan-
sions in eligibility since 1981 and serves as a reference for the following discussion. 
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The parallels between the Medicaid expansion of the 1980s and the planned ex-
pansion are obvious, but several differences are worth noting. First, the expansion of the 
1980s came through a series of eligibility expansions.13 These began in 1984 with AFDC 
children under 5 and select AFDC-eligible pregnant women. omnibus budget legislation 
in 1990 then extended Medicaid to all children and pregnant women under 133 percent of 
Federal poverty level (Fpl)14 and added the Medicare cost-sharing of dual eligibles to 
Medicaid’s responsibilities. In contrast, all new PPACA-eligible beneficiaries will qualify 
for the program on January 1, 2014. Second, the federal government provided no financial 
help during the 1980s; matching rates remained the same.15 More money was pumped into 
states by the federal arm, but states were also more fully responsible for cost increases, 
which brought on an increase in the number enrolled. in contrast, the federal government 
will share a significant portion of costs of upcoming expansions; instead of phasing-in 
coverage, they phase in cost-sharing, initially covering all expenses and the gradually re-
ducing reimbursement levels that ultimately remain higher for newly eligibles. Third, the 
scope of these mandates differ by significant amounts. Coverage twenty years ago doubled 
(which represents a 100 percent increase in enrollment) whereas researchers predict a 25-
33 percent increase under recent legislation.16 17 in other words, the number of enrollees 
jumped from 500,000 to 1,000,000 between 1987 and 1993; projected increases put the 
next expansion from approximately 1,200,000 to 1,450,000. Both the raw numbers af-
fected and the percentage change under ppACA will be smaller. Fourth, each expansion (or 
set of expansions) was passed under different political environments. The expansions of 
the 1980s were passed through Omnibus Budget bills which were not health-specific; the 
recent expansion was passed through a comprehensive piece of health reform legislation.18 
The impact of these additional reforms is addressed later.
Beginning of TennCare
As seen, the 1980s brought a gradual increase in the population states were required to 
cover through their Medicaid programs. Implemented with no federal fiscal support, states 
were tasked with accommodating these new enrollees; Tennessee was no exception. In five 
years, enrollment doubled and expenditures tripled, leaving the state with few options.19 
While enrollment likely was not the only cause of increased costs, Tennessee’s budget 
could not sustain this rate of increase. The Blue Ribbon Task Force, commissioned by 
Table 1.1: Tennessee Medicaid Coverage: State and Federal Changes, 1981 – 2014
Year Cuts or Expansions in eligible Medicaid Population Bill
1981, 1982 Federal Cuts omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 Tax equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
1984 – 1989 Federal expansion
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 
Consolidated omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 
Family support Act of 1988 
omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989
1994 Tennessee expansion TennCare section 1115 Waiver
2005 Tennessee Cuts Waiver Amendments
2010 Tennessee Cuts Waiver Amendments
2014 Federal expansion patient protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
source: Kaiser Medicaid history11; Jonathan engel 12
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then governor ned McWherter and chaired by Dr. William Frist, who later became senate 
Majority leader, gave legislators three options: 1) increases taxes, a politically infeasible 
move; 2) Reduce Medicaid services, a move counter to McWherter’s vision for the state; 
or 3) Reform the delivery and financing of the current system.
Threatened with the insolvency of Tennessee’s Medicaid program in 1994, governor 
ned McWherter led a drastic overhaul to implement a new managed care system to be 
dubbed TennCare.20 The state successfully petitioned a section 1115 demonstration waiver 
to transition 800,000 enrollees to managed care in order to save costs. Additional savings, 
realized by reallocating Disproportionate share hospital (Dsh) payments, allowed the 
program to expand its eligibility requirements to two additional groups – those uninsured 
and the uninsurable (now referred to as “medically eligible”). 
Disproportionate share hospital (Dsh) payments were designed to sustain hospi-
tals that provide more care to Medicaid-eligible populations than other hospitals.21 states 
and the federal government share these costs in the Medicaid program. each state sets dif-
ferent requirements to identify eligible hospitals but must follow minimum federal guide-
lines. in the late 1980s, states used funding from provider taxes and local governments 
to increase the amount of Dsh money the state received from this uncapped source. The 
rapid growth in these funds led to the passage of the Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and 
Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991 (P.L. 102-234) that reduced the amount of 
donated funds eligible for a federal match and capped Dsh payments at 12 percent of the 
Medicaid budget. This bill also locked in state contributions at 1992 levels; Tennessee was 
classified as a state with “high” DSH spending since this consumed 17.6 percent of its total 
Medicaid spending.22 The new law went into effect in 1993 and Tennessee faced loses of 
$494 million in Medicaid payments.23 TennCare began the next year and worked with CMs 
to reallocate these funds into its managed care program.
in 2005, the budget once again led Tennessee governor phil Bredesen to advocate 
drastic action. This time, the Democratic governor and one-time health insurance execu-
tive borrowed solutions from the private sector. TennCare dropped coverage for option-
al groups, including those who would be otherwise uninsured because of a pre-existing 
condition. Bredesen replaced the federally-matched program with a high-risk program 
and with a less-expensive state-subsidized insurance program for small businesses called 
CoverTn. Ample savings were possible through premium cost-sharing; the state, the busi-
ness, and the beneficiary each paid one-third of the costs. In 2009, this program covered 
approximately 22,000 people at a cost of $20 million, which still left many without cover-
age.24 This cost equals $910 per capita for the state, in contrast with the $4,106 per capita 
spent on TennCare services. AccessTn creates a high-risk pool in which individuals can 
purchase coverage. The state spends $3,841 to cover each high-risk individual compared to 
the estimated $7,500 spent on elderly and high-risk individuals in 2006.25 
Despite these overarching changes in public programs, Tennessee saw no change in 
Dsh funding through its dealings with CMs. still operating under a waiver because of the 
continued reliance on managed care, federal payments for Dsh hospitals were still redirect-
ed to insurers. however, the Tax Relief and health Care Act of 2006 granted the state Dsh 
funds in 2007, the Children’s health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (ChipRA) 
extended these funds through 2012, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) allocated additional Dsh payments. Together, Dsh funds are set to expire in 
2013, just before the enactment of the Medicaid enrollment. 
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Recent Recession and 2010 Cuts
economic dips have a unique impact on public programs that serve low-income popula-
tions: while the need for the programs increase, government revenues decrease. As a result 
of the current recession, most states are facing budget shortfalls. The federal government 
intervened in 2009 with a stimulus bill known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (ARRA). The bill included an increase in federal matching funds for Medicaid pro-
grams, which allowed many states to lessen or delay cuts while stimulus funds were avail-
able. Tennessee also received a nine percentage point increase in its Federal Matching 
Assistance percentage (FMAp), the reimbursement rate for its Medicaid spending.
Despite stimulus funds, Tennessee’s continual decrease in sales tax revenue com-
pounded with a continual increase in TennCare expenditures led governor Bredesen to 
propose benefit cuts in the 2010-2011 budget.26 These changes would cut therapy services 
and drastically limit hospital and office care for non-institutionalized adults in order to save 
$99.4 million to help address an estimated $1 billion budget shortfall. A recent decision by 
CMs to return a portion of the federal share of the Medicaid drug rebate allowed the state 
to postpone most of these cuts for one year.27 
Current TennCare Landscape
Below, a table displays current TennCare eligibility for major categories. like many other 
states, Tennessee does not cover low-income adults who do not have dependent children. 
As noted before, these eligibility levels differ drastically from the TennCare of five years 
ago since they do not include Tennesseans who are uninsured due to lack of employer-
sponsored group insurance or because of pre-existing conditions.28 ppACA expands cover-
age for all individuals to 133 percent Fpl, which will cover previously excluded childless 
adults as well as more parents. The reference income threshold column is for a family of 
four. 
given its dynamic history over the past twenty years, TennCare is in a unique 
position to absorb this next round of mandates. some aspects – our reduced Medicaid 
rolls and lack of Dsh payments – may actually sustain Tennessee when the Medicaid 
expansion is implemented. For example, I show that the reductions over the past five 
years open Tennessee to more federal dollars. since Tennessee will have more “newly 
eligible” Medicaid enrollees because our current eligibility is lower, Tennessee receives a 
higher match for these individuals. in addition, i examine the roll of uncompensated care 
and Dsh payment reductions that Tennessee largely avoids in absence of these funds. 
Uncompensated care is expected to decrease since fewer individuals will be uninsured 
and unable to pay their hospitals bills. Additionally, ppACA will gradually reduce Dsh 
Table 1.2: Current TennCare Eligibility
Category Eligibility (As % of FPL)
Income Threshold 
(For a family of 4)
infant 185% $40,792
Child Age 1 – 5 133% $29,326
Child Age 6 – 19 100% $22,050










Income for a Full-Time Minimum Wage Worker: $15,080
source: Tennessee Center for policy Research 29; Fpl levels 30
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payments to 25 percent of their current rates. since Tennessee receives only temporary 
DSH payments, Tennessee hospitals will not receive these fiscal cuts. These ideas are fur-
ther expanded in part 2.
Health Reform
As previously referenced, the pending Medicaid expansion comes as part of comprehen-
sive health reform. other provisions will impact the implementation of these new Medicaid 
requirements. outlining major components of the full bill further contextualizes the 
Medicaid expansion, allowing a more complete understanding of potential impacts of the 
remainder of the bill. As such, before expanding on details of the expansion, i outline gen-
eral goals of the bill and highlight two specific components – Health Insurance Exchanges 
and the employer and individual mandates – that will impact the expansion most directly. 
Goals of Health Reform 
our country ranks 37th in a report released by the World health organization because of 
the gaps in insurance coverage and the resulting gaps in health care access of our popula-
tion as a whole.31 Financial considerations remain at the core of many inadequacies in 
our system. Since health care costs increase at a higher rate than base inflation, health 
care costs have steadily eaten up a larger portion of our nation’s gross Domestic product 
and accordingly have gradually priced more and more Americans out of health coverage. 
in addition, health insurance companies, as logical businesses, seek to minimize loss to 
maximize profits. These business techniques, however, often result in practices that block 
high-risk individuals from the market and seek only the healthy to insure. in other words, 
increasing costs and business awareness of bottom lines have left many uninsured. While 
other factors, including lifestyle, contribute to the overall health of Americans, high infla-
tion and incomplete insurance coverage represent core problems that Congress addressed 
in recent legislation; below i outline these goals in more detail.
Advocacy groups have pushed strongly for their issues to be included in this round 
of discussion. still, ppACA, while expansive, has a limited scope. The problem of 47 mil-
lion uninsured Americans has remained in the spotlight throughout, but the underinsured 
population, a large subset of those insured but at risk of bankruptcy if they face a major 
health crisis because of inadequate insurance coverage, have received much less attention. 
Additionally, the bills put much effort into reforming the individual and small group health 
insurance markets that boast exorbitant prices and discriminatory selection of custom-
ers, but ignore job-lock problems created by employer-sponsored insurance. Additionally, 
Congress has given much attention to the inflation in health care, which outgrows base 
inflation, since it is making health care inaccessible for more and more people. But public 
health concerns are not being adequately addressed, in spite of increasing obesity and the 
need for prevention. in short, ppACA makes larges strides in some areas but provides in-
adequate solutions for other problems.
Moreover, the rhetoric and the extent of reform has shifted over the past year as 
conversations have clarified what issues will be addressed in the current bills. Public health 
concerns have become less important to Congress, as the focus has increasingly shifted 
to reforming the insurance system. Even delivery system reforms in the bills take a fi-
nancial form – changing reimbursements – as opposed to true organizational changes. As 
gail Wilensky, senior fellow at project hope and former Medicare administrator, empha-
sizes, tensions exist between finding quick money for financing reform and implement-
ing long-lasting health care savings and quality improvements.32 Unfortunately, she said, 
encouraging integrated delivery systems, management of chronic disease, and reducing 
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inappropriate admissions do not show savings when scored by the Congressional Budget 
Office. “The ways you get money quickly are not the ways that produce the kind of changes 
you need for quality,” she told reporters. 
As stated in early versions of both the house and senate versions, the patient 
protection and Affordable Care Act (ppACA) aim is “to provide affordable, quality health 
care for all Americans and reduce the growth in health care spending.”33 of particular in-
terest, this statement of purpose specifies accessibility of health care as the ultimate goal. 
While many in the health community acknowledge the need for a wider range of reforms, 
PPACA was designed with this specific goal. Major objectives can also be seen in the 
president’s september 2009 address to a Joint session,34 which identified four specific 
areas of concern that clarify the purpose statement of the bill, which i summarize as: 1. 
Regulating the insurance industry, 2. Covering the uninsured, 3. Reducing the growth rate 
of health care inflation,35 and 4. Responsibly sustaining current public programs. Again, all 
areas are insurance reforms. 
More specifically, PPACA addresses the inaccessibility of insurance due to risk 
selection and costs. insurers institute many risk selection factors in order to maintain a 
healthy bottom line.36 often, this translates to denying coverage to those with pre-existing 
conditions, to retroactively denying coverage, to demanding drastically higher premiums 
for those in higher risk groups, and to capping total payouts for individuals. Because of 
these business strategies, many Americans cannot obtain health insurance. legislation at-
tempts to resolve this problem, either by providing alternative coverage or by regulating 
these aspects of insurance coverage. Additionally, legislation mandates coverage for in-
dividuals and employers and provides increased government assistance to meet this goal, 
through subsidies and Medicaid expansions. Moreover, costs of health care are climbing 
at exorbitant rates and must be controlled.37 legislation aims to do its part to control costs, 
with the understanding that the private sector needs to implement its own cost controls as 
well.38 
other concerns with the bill, including the proper role of government in regards to 
health and health care, have become a factor in debate. still, reform addresses concerns 
with insurance coverage of Americans and costs to individuals and government. As such, 
the success of these proposals is defined both by how well they achieve goals of coverage 
and cost-control and by their political viability. 
Provisions in PPACA
Among many other provisions, ppACA creates a health insurance exchanges in the states 
(or regions), institutes mandates that could increase enrollment, and raises Medicaid eligi-
bility. Below, i outline these three major provisions of the health reform law, each chosen 
for its scope and contribution to major reform goals. not coincidentally, these provisions 
will create the most changes in public programs offered by Tennessee. 
Health Insurance Exchange
Creating new health insurance exchanges, originally one of the less controversial provi-
sions in the bill, forms the cornerstone of the reform law. The exchanges aim to make the 
small group and individual insurance market more consumer-friendly to enhance competi-
tion while reducing unethical practices. The exchanges could be compared to comparison 
shopping websites like priceline39; an online interface would allow consumers to compare 
rates for similar plan. Benefit plans will contain standardized benefits and provide informa-
tion in an easy-to-compare format. The bill outlines four benefits categories of plans that 
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would be offered that vary based on the cost amount the plan covers.40 Funding would also 
be available to start health cooperatives. subsidies would be offered within the exchange to 
assist families up to 400 percent of the Federal poverty level (Fpl) in purchasing the plans 
such that their costs would not exceed 2 – 9.5 percent of their income, based on a graduated 
scale. importantly, plans in the exchange must guarantee issue and renewal to all enrollees 
so no one could be denied coverage for a pre-existing condition.
Advocates of the health insurance exchanges argue they will cut costs by improving 
competition. They create more uniform plans and bring them together in a more open mar-
ketplace. The offered subsidies improve the affordability, thereby increasing the consumer 
base. opponents argue that increasing the number of consumers will subsequently drive up 
the costs of care; more demand translates into higher costs and counters the positive impact 
of the subsidy.
in light of a federally subsidized health insurance plan, Tennessee’s CoverTn sub-
sidized insurance program becomes redundant, as will be explored in part 2 on “program 
Cuts and Reductions” in more depth.
Mandates 
in order to reach the goal of universal coverage, the bill includes both employer and in-
dividual mandates. The employer mandate requires large- and medium-sized employers, 
those with over 50 employees, to provide insurance for their employees. in some cases, 
they would face a fine if they failed to cover their workers. Similarly, the individual man-
date requires individuals to purchase or enroll in insurance or face a fine; in most cases, 
provisions are made to ensure affordability of the insurance or to exempt those who cannot 
afford the premiums (see Table 1.3). supporters insist that both mandates must be institut-
ed together as a critical component in ensuring that health reform as a whole is successful. 
opponents argue that mandates are simply another tax that will punish those who cannot 
afford insurance. 
in addition to noting that mandates are a way towards universal coverage, support-
ers  point to the cost-shifting that now occurs when people are uninsured. Their uncom-
pensated care is absorbed by the hospital and the government and passed along to others 
via higher premiums or higher taxes. As such, all have a “shared responsibility” to obtain 
insurance coverage to avoid unpaid bills. opponents question the Constitutionality of the 
mandates as well as their unintended consequences. They argue that Congress does not 
Table 1.3: Summary of Mandate Penalties
patient protection and Affordable Care Act (p.l. 111-148)  
as amended by the health Care and education Reconciliation Act of 2010
individual Mandate
Penalty: The greater of $695 ind ($2085/family), or 2.5% of household 
income 
 
Exemptions: Financial hardships, religious objections, those without in-
surance for less than 3 months, if the lowest plan exceeds 8% of income, 
or if income is below filing threshold or $9,350 (in which case you’d 
qualify for Medicaid)
employer Mandate
Penalty: For companies that do not offer insurance - $2,000 / employee 
 
Do offer insurance, but have people using subsidies in the exchange, the 
lesser of - $3000 / person getting subsidy oR $2,000 / employee 
 
Exemptions: employers with under 50 employees
source: Kaiser health Reform side-by-side42
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have the authority to impose such a requirement on individual citizens.41 Further, they see 
the mandates as simply a hidden tax that punishes individuals for personal decisions.
As a point of comparison, mandated car insurance receives little political fanfare. 
Most states require drivers to obtain liability insurance for their vehicles to protect others 
in the case of an accident. proponents compare the health insurance mandate to car insur-
ance mandates since both serve to protect the financial well being of others. In a car acci-
dent, the responsible party contributes to the damages. if someone needs extensive medical 
care, their insurance will help them cover the costs; otherwise, the hospital incurs cost and 
arguably passes these costs along to private insurance companies. opponents point to sub-
stantive differences between the two mandates.43 A health insurance mandate, they argue, 
impacts everyone, regardless of their choice to obtain specific types of property, such as a 
car, so the mandate is an overreach of federal authority. 
A third perspective offered by leonard Burman of the Urban institute compares the 
mandate to tax credits for owning a home, having a dependent child, or making a charitable 
contribution. These tax breaks could save a married couple $7,000 for home ownership or 
$1,300 for a having a child.44 Thus, he argues, the mandate represents a mere rhetorical dif-
ference aimed at increasing the number of Americans who buy insurance.
in light of varying explanations and opinions on the individual mandate, Tennessee 
residents may or may not respond to this mandate. if they do, enrollment numbers for 
Medicaid may increase even though many who are Medicaid-eligible are not at risk of 
incurring the penalty. This “culture of insurance” is covered in more depth later.
Medicaid Expansion
in addition, the bill will expand Medicaid eligibility to 133 percent of Federal poverty 
level as another method to achieve universal coverage. As you may recall, current law 
prohibits coverage of large portions of the population that may otherwise be eligible by 
income level since many states only cover adults with children, children, and the disabled. 
The new legislation would greatly expand the number of those eligible for this state cov-
erage by including all who meet the income requirement. Table 1.4 shows the updated 
TennCare eligibility that will go into effect in 2014.
once the expansion takes effect, federal funding will divide Medicaid enrollees into 
two groups – those eligible before reforms and those eligible after reforms. To assists states 
with the increase in enrollees, the federal matching rate will be higher for those newly 
eligible.
These two provisions – the individual mandate to obtain health insurance and the 
expansion of Medicaid – have caught the attention of those concerned with state budgets. 
Governor Phil Bredesen’s office reported that an earlier version of the Senate bill would 
cost the state $735 million between 2014 and 2019 (Part 2 on the “Cost Estimate” includes 
Table 1.4: Reformed TennCare Eligibility, 2014 (Changes in Bold)
Category Current Eligibility (As % of FPL)
New Eligibility 
(As % of FPL)
Income Threshold 
(For a family of 4)
infant 185% 185% $40,792
Child Age 1 – 5 133% 133% $29,326
Child Age 6 – 19 100% 133% $29,326
ALL Adults 
under 65
80% working parents 
70 non-working parents 133% $29,326
source: Kaiser health Reform side-by-side45
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a break-down of this estimate). This large figure is particularly troubling in light of de-
creased state revenues and spending cuts in the existing TennCare plan. As Bredesen states 
in his letter:
[B]y 2013, we expect to have returned to our 2008 levels of revenue and will have 
already cut programs dramatically – over a billion dollars. At that point, we have 
to start digging out – we will not have given raises to state employees or teachers 
for five years, our pension plans will need shoring up, our cash reserves (“rainy 
day funds”) will have been considerably depleted and in need of restoration, and 
we will not have made any substantial new investments for years. There will have 
been major cuts to areas such as Children’s services that we really need to restore. 
on top of these, there are all the usual obligations that need to be met – Medicaid, 
for example, will continue to grow at rates in excess of the economy and our tax 
revenues. it’s going to take at least a full decade to dig our way out and back to 
where we were prior to the recession … These are hard dollars – we can’t borrow 
them …
i would point out that the problem is entirely recession-related. if our revenues had 
grown from the 2008 base at the normal average rates we have experienced over 
the years – good times and bad – we would have well over $2 billion of additional 
revenue in 2019 (and smaller obligations in the pension area) and would definitely 
be prepared to accommodate reform.
As Governor Bredsen aptly states, the recession will force our state to make difficult 
spending choices over the coming years.
Moreover, organizations and leaders from both sides of the aisle, both nationally and 
locally, have voiced concern with increasing federal control as well as the fiscal obliga-
tions that will be handed down to states. in one article, the heritage Foundation correctly 
reminds readers that state participation in the Medicaid program is optional46; Arizona, for 
example, did not join the program until 1982, seventeen years after its inception.47 ending 
Medicaid in the state would, however, be a drastic move that would gravely endanger both 
Tennessee hospitals who have become dependent on federal matching funds to cover their 
costs as well as Tennessee residents who would still be required to purchase insurance but 
have no affordable option to do so. newt gingrich, in an American enterprise institute 
article, argued for state-control, harkening to age-old federalist debates about the power of 
the states versus the federal government.48 The national governor’s Association, in mul-
tiple statements, emphasizes the ability of states to more accurately understand their own 
fiscal limitations. As NGA Executive Director Ray Scheppach explains,
Just as no state is offering the maximum of all possible options; neither does any 
state cover only the bare minimum mandates. Every state makes political and fiscal 
calculations with regard to how expansive they can afford their Medicaid program 
to be. Therefore, imposing broad new unfunded mandates upon states could force 
them to reduce spending on optional categories.49
Accordingly, Bredesen’s cost estimate included reducing the coverage of optional 
groups. Further expansion, they argue, would reduce funding for other programs. The re-
mainder of this paper explores these concerns and outlines what the state should expect in 
regards to the cost of the expansion.
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Summary and Conclusions
The Medicaid program was born of necessity and has undergone many changes in the past 
four decades. Today’s Medicaid expansion occurs alongside insurance mandates, the open-
ing of health insurance exchanges, and an on-going recession. Many predictions have 
been made and yet we still know little about how the public, the providers, and the payers 
will respond to these changes. on top of the unknowns, unique conditions in Tennessee, 
namely our lack of a state income tax, decreased enrollment, absence of Dsh payments, 
and our managed care program will interact with these new changes in distinctive ways. 
We do know that Medicaid rolls have been previously both expanded and reduced. new 
funds were allocated for the program or savings were realized from program changes in 
order to expand. Through these experiences, we also know that expanding coverage alone 
does not address the problem of rising costs. in other words, the Medicaid expansion will 
increase costs. Many interpretations of the impact of the provisions are available; as such 
the next section describes factors that could impact the ultimate cost of the expansion and 
provides a vague estimate. 
Costs and Savings
The following section explores factors that must be considered when working with a cost 
estimate of the Medicaid expansion. in order to understand fully the components of this 
estimate, I first draw on existing research to identify potential qualities of the population 
the program would impact. From this discussion, i estimate that full enrollment is unlikely 
and represents an upper bound. Thus, the upper bound net costs to implement the expan-
sion of Medicaid is $2.3 billion, assuming full enrollment and health care inflation held 
constant at its current high rate. The following conversation further explores parameters of 
this estimate, including a sensitivity analysis of parameter assumptions.
Considerations
Before quantifying potential costs of expanding Medicaid, i outline factors that will in-
fluence the implementation – and consequently the costs – of the bill. This type of cost 
estimate requires sweeping assumptions about the behavior of people in order to reach 
any useful estimate. Understanding these assumptions will allow this estimate to evolve 
as factors become known. i have divided confounding factors into two groups: access and 
utilization factors and health factors. each set depends on human behavior as well as how 
the bill is implemented, which depends largely on decisions made by the state and by the 
Department of health and human services. 
As such, my first task was to characterize the population that would be affected by 
the Medicaid expansion and by the individual mandate. As previously noted, two groups 
will enroll in Medicaid after the expansion – those currently eligible but unenrolled and 
those newly eligible. Before making an estimate, it is important to understand the health 
and habits of these people since the nature of this population will impact the success and 
costs of this program.
The following example clarifies these types of consequences. Estimating costs re-
quires using data on the currently enrolled Medicaid population in place of unknowns 
about the newly affected populations. For example, my estimate uses the current rate of 
expenditures for the currently enrolled population to estimate costs for the newly enrolled 
populations assuming that covering these different populations will cost the state the same 
amount. in contrast, these populations may have different types of health needs that require 
differing amounts of health services.
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The following discussion draws from the work of previous researchers in order to 
better understand how these factors will alter the projection that i outline later in this sec-
tion. Much of this work is based on national studies, so some generalizations apply nation-
ally; also, this analysis is not comprehensive. i examine the likelihood that this population 
enrolls in Medicaid, the likelihood that they subsequently utilize health services, and the 
health of this population. 
Enrollment
Traditionally, public programs – health care related and non-health care related – are not 
fully utilized by the eligible population. For example, the Food stamp program reached 
31 percent of its target group two years into the program; after recent outreach efforts, the 
program reached 67 percent of its target but still does not enroll all eligible persons.50 Five 
years after its inception, the Children’s health insurance program (Chip) enrolled 60 per-
cent of eligible children; likewise, the Medicare savings program only reached 33 percent 
of intended recipients ten years after creation. Accordingly, TennCare does not reach the 
whole of its currently eligible population; an estimated 200,000 individuals who may be 
eligible are not enrolled in this program.51 if the current Medicaid expansion follows this 
pattern, only a fraction of those eligible will enroll; consequently, the state would spend 
less than projected on Medicaid assuming full enrollment.
in contrast to existing programs, the current expansion is accompanied by an indi-
vidual mandate to obtain the product it provides. Because the mandate will impose fines on 
individuals who fail to obtain coverage, Medicaid most likely will see an increase in currently 
eligibles and in newly eligibles. still, while the exact impact is unknown, 2004 Massachusetts 
reforms provide an informative case study. similarly to national health reform, Massachusetts’ 
reforms included both a mandate for individual coverage as well as an expansion of public 
programs. Also like national efforts, the penalty for those not covered by insurance did not 
impact those at the lowest income levels, who are also the target of Medicaid programs. even 
though this population would not face a fine, they often enrolled in the program. According 
to analysis by stan Dorn, Massachusetts’ reforms, along with the accompanying public edu-
cation campaigns, made it easy for people to enroll in new state health coverage programs.52 
As a result of this phenomenon – as well as a host of other innovative enrollment techniques 
– 97 percent of Massachusetts’ residents have health coverage. The Massachusetts example 
suggests that a combination of public education and enrollment modifications can drastically 
raise the rate of Medicaid enrollment. Consequently, if Tennessee employs these techniques, 
the state should expect higher rates and, consequently, higher costs.
Access and Utilization
once this population has health coverage, other factors will impede their ability to obtain 
this coverage. These factors, accordingly, have both fiscal and public health impacts. Both 
access and utilization will impact the extent to which this new population will utilize its 
new insurance coverage. Access, or the ease with which an individual can obtain health 
care, is a concern often associated with current Medicaid programs. several factors impact 
access to care, including the number of Medicaid doctors and the location of health ser-
vices. First, since Medicaid reimbursements are well below those of Medicare and private 
companies, providers are reluctant to see patients with this coverage. in addition, health 
care facilities are often located in more wealthy, more populated areas. As a result, those 
in lower-income communities have to travel farther to find needed physicians; a lack of 
access to transportation compounds this problem. Due to these and other barriers to care, 
patients may not receive the treatments they need, not because of inability to pay, but be-
cause of confounding factors that impede access.
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Furthermore, we cannot assume that having coverage will automatically compel 
people to seek health care. Different cultures have different views on the benefits of health 
care that may change their utilization rates of this care. For example, women of color often 
delay prenatal care; this trend could in part by explained by different cultural views.53 some 
groups even have negative views of health care as a profession. negative stigmas may have 
prevented certain groups from pursuing coverage on their own; likewise, compulsory cov-
erage would not be likely to compel them to see a physician even for serious conditions. if 
rates of use differ, costs for the currently uninsured population could also differ.
in addition, this expansion of coverage may have a minimal additional cost because 
those within that income bracket already spend-down, or spend their assets so they meet the 
qualifying levels of the program. Thus, the new bill allows these sick patients to maintain 
their assets while receiving medical care without drastically increasing costs for TennCare. 
in contrast, however, Tennessee hospitals saw major increases in uncompensated care fol-
lowing the TennCare cuts in 2005.
A report by Thomas Miller finds an increased utilization of the emergency room by 
those enrolled on Medicaid. if this new population follows this trend for eR use, which 
seems the easiest way for new enrollees to develop a relationship with the health system, 
then expenditures will increase. This trend also represents an area for cost control; if the 
program can connect enrollees to the health care system at other points, the state can reduce 
the use of expensive emergency care.
Another interesting story hints at the potential savings that may be seen as a result 
of fully covering this population. This report, published in the new england Journal of 
Medicine, compared the Medicare expenditures of those who were insured or uninsured 
from ages 50 – 64 before becoming Medicare-eligible. once of Medicaid age, the con-
sumption of health services by those newly insured is significantly greater than the usage 
by their previously-insured counterparts.54 This study supports the notion that expanding 
Medicaid, at least for this population, will decrease program costs for Medicare. According 
to the authors, “the costs of expanding health insurance coverage for uninsured adults be-
fore they reach the age of 65 years may be partially offset by subsequent reductions in 
health care use and spending for these adults after the age of 65, particularly if they have 
cardiovascular disease or diabetes before the age of 65 years.” Unfortunately, these par-
ticular savings would be felt at the federal level since states are not fiscally responsible for 
Medicare unless the state sees similar savings across age groups.
Health
Understanding the health and health needs of the population of newly eligibles is another 
way to estimate the potential rate at which this population will use health services. For ex-
ample, if this population is generally healthier than the current Medicaid population, then 
the Medicaid expansion would cost less for the state. Current research presents conflicting 
pictures of the health of this population. 
A 2001 study by the Urban institute found that uninsured eligibles are in better 
health than Medicaid-enrolled counterparts but still have unmet needs.55 This suggests 
that expanding coverage would cost less per capita since these patients would need less 
care; at the same time, expanding their coverage would enable this population to obtain 
needed care. This study focused on the currently Medicaid-eligible population to determine 
health differences between adults enrolled in the program, those privately insured, and 
those uninsured. The study did not, however, examine the health of the total population 
that meets the income criteria for Medicaid. As such, significant portions of the popula-
tion were not included in this study, including childless adults and those between current 
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income thresholds and the new federal flat rate at 133 percent. Consequently, this report 
offers no conclusive information on the health of the entire population that will be affected 
by the expansion. still the study suggests that the cost of covering those currently eligible 
but unenrolled will be less than current expenditures.
According to Thomas Miller of the American enterprise institute, uninsured indi-
viduals are more likely to report their health as “good to excellent,” which may suggest that 
people do not buy insurance unless they are sick or at risk and need insurance coverage.56 
Other studies, however, have contradictory findings. A Health Affairs paper finds that un-
insured individuals have a greater chance to go with undiagnosed hypertension, diabetes, 
and elevated cholesterol; these conditions are best treated early and cause greater health ex-
penditures when discovered later.57 Undiagnosed conditions that have yet to exhibit symp-
toms would not prompt survey participants to characterize their health as “fair” or “poor.” 
Additionally, a joint study by RAnD and price Waterhouse found that patients do not shift 
medical treatments to periods in which they are insured.58 This surprising finding supports 
another point made by Miller; those uninsured for just part of the year spend 75 percent 
of what those with insurance do on health care. Consequently, if patients do not shift care, 
access less care, and go without needed diagnoses, one can infer that the uninsured go 
without necessary care, regardless of how they self-report their own health. Whether these 
patients would have received this care if they were insured is quite another matter.
Based on the above-cited reports, we are no closer to categorizing the health and 
potential service utilization of those who would be newly eligible for Medicaid. in the 
absence of directed studies to answer this specific question, we must extrapolate from 
existing research that often yields contradictory results. The Medicaid expansion assumes 
that this population has conditions that need treatment, but we cannot definitively predict 
whether they will access said treatments. TennCare should carefully monitor usage chang-
es in this new population in order to develop targeted cost reduction plans. 
Cost Estimate
As a result of the variability of the implementation process and the unknowns about the 
expansion group, reaching an exact estimate of the cost impact of the Medicaid expansion 
is not possible. governor phil Bredesen released an estimate of $735 million from 2014 – 
2019 in october 2009 based on the language of the senate Finance bill (see Table 2.1).59 
His calculations are below for reference. My estimate of $2.3 billion over this same five-
year time period incorporates the language of the final version of the bill. Below, I explain 
the assumptions and methods used to reach this estimate. since i was not able to obtain the 
governor’s assumptions, i cannot comment directly on the large difference between the two 
estimates. A different set of assumptions or use of a different data set would easily alter any 
estimate. Further, my work provides a high-end estimate, while the governor seeks middle 
ground. still, my work should allow open conversation on how the state can address these 
costs in a way that also benefits the health of Tennesseans. 
Governor Bredesen’s estimate does present a few interesting findings. First, the state 
would spend much more to cover those already eligible for coverage. in other words, the 
primary fiscal concern is increased demand for a product already offered. This assumes 
Medicaid eligible parents will obtain free coverage from the state instead of incur a fiscal 
penalty, which also assumes that this population makes economically rational decisions. 
As discussed above, neither of these assumptions is absolute. secondly, Bredesen includes 
elimination of optional groups above the new threshold as a source of savings. While it 
is possible that the next governor will follow this trend, i do not include such cuts in my 
estimate.
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Methods
in light of incomplete information regarding the process of implementation and the char-
acteristics of the expansion population, assumptions were necessary for the purpose of a 
cost estimate. once these assumptions were made, calculating an estimate of the cost of the 
Medicaid expansion was straightforward. The methods for choosing inflation rate, costs 
per capita of new enrollees, federal reimbursement rate, and the numbers of new enrollees 
are explained below. Again, given the unknowns and dynamic nature of this expansion, any 
of these measures is subject to change. As such, i will later explore the sensitivity of costs 
to two variables – inflation and enrollment.
Inflation was based on the figure used in the governor’s estimate to approximate 
future TennCare expenses.61 This number consequently reflects the rate expected by gov-
ernment analysts. While the bill aims to reduce inflation, the amount to which this occurs 
is unknown. sensitivity analyses later, however, explore the impact of alternate parameter 
assumptions. 
All cost calculations began with the amount spent per capita on health services for 
current enrollees in TennCare in 2009. (The costs for new enrollees were assumed to be the 
same as costs for current enrollees.)
Table 2.1: Governor’s Estimate: October 5, 2009
Projected Tennessee Net New Costs of Senate Finance Reform 2014-2019 $ millions
Best estimate Optimistic Pessimistic
New Medicaid Members
1. newly eligible Members $175 434 175
2. Already eligible not enrolled 911 488 1361
3.   Total new Membership $1086 922 1537
Cost Savings Offsets
4. elimination of optional groups >133% $(78) (78) (78)
5. Additional Drug Rebates (net) (191) (191) (191)
6. Tn-CoverTn elimination (91) (91) (91)
7. Tn-AccessTn savings (31) (31) (31)
8. Tn-CoverRX savings (6) (6) (6)
9. $(397) $(397) $(397)
Additional Costs
10. Mandated pharmacy extensions $30 30 30
11. presumptive eligibility net Costs 16 16 16
$46 46 46
12. Total State Costs of Reform $735 571 1186
source: governor’s letter to Corker60
Table 2.2: Assumptions in Cost Estimate
Inflation 6.7%







but not enrolled 198,130
Federal Matching Assistance percentage
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Equation 1
2009 per Capita spending = Total health services expenditures / Total enrollees
Cost per capita were calculated from figures in the 2009 – 2010 state budget. The 
amount spent on health care services was divided by corresponding enrollment. long-
term care was not included. Consequently, this assumes that the majority of new enrollees 
will not be disabled or elderly, groups that consume the largest amount of care. Also, no 
difference was made in the amount spent on children and adults even though this amount 
has been shown to differ greatly. The most recent break down by status, based on 2006 
data, showed a sizeable difference in children’s and adults’ costs (see Table 2.3). A more 
significant difference was found between these amounts and the average spent in 2009, 
excluding long-term care and home-based services used mainly for the population that is 
developmentally delayed. This figure indicated a sizeable increase in services rendered to 
mainly adults and children. in short, available data did not allow further differentiation for 
those disabled and those who have elderly status in the cost analysis.
Two separate reimbursement rates (FMAp) were used – one for currently eligibles 
and one for newly eligible. i assumed a return to the pre-stimulus FMAp – the 2008 rate 
of 64 percent, which historically has held constant. Under the new law, the state receives 
higher federal contributions for those newly eligible (see Table 2.4). 
As a result of these higher matching rates, the state pays significantly less per capita 
for these new participants. if the state unilaterally decided to expand coverage to this same 
population, the state would spend an additional $816 per person (see Table 2.5).
in other words, since Tennessee will see increased matching rates for its expansion 
population, Tennessee receives a more cost-effective method of increasing Medicaid eligi-
bility levels. If the state had undertaken reform on its own, the state would pay significantly 
more per capita to cover more people on Medicaid since this increased rate would not have 
Table 2.3: Medicaid Payments per Enrollee, FY 2006 






    Total, 2009, 
    excluding long-term and home care $4,106
source: statehealthFacts.org 62
Table 2.4: FMAP for Newly Eligible Medicaid Participants
FMAP for Newly Eligible 
Medicaid Participants
Year Rate





source: Kaiser health Reform side-by-side 63
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been available. As shown in Table 2.6, Tennessee will spend significantly less per new 
enrollee, over $2,000 in savings in 2020. granted, the state is still required to cover this 
new population.
i used data available from statehealthFacts.org to estimate the number of Tennesseans 
eligible for TennCare (see Table 2.7). Various sources do estimate the number of unin-
sured at different levels because they use different methods. For example, the Center for 
Business and economic Research at the University of Tennessee estimated that 616,967 or 
10 percent of the population was uninsured in 2009.64 FamiliesUsA, in contrast, places that 
number at 1,722,000 or 32.4 percent for of the population for 2007-2008 since it includes 
anyone who went without insurance at any point during the year.65 statehealthFacts.org is 
in the middle with a 2008 estimate of 904,100 uninsured Tennesseans.66 Consequently, es-
timates based on different data may easily differ from those outlined below. still, the given 
estimates fall into ranges given by Heritage (250,000) and the TennCare office (200,000) 
for the expansion population.67 My estimates found that approximately 260,000 will be-
come newly eligible for TennCare and approximately 200,000 are currently eligible but 
unenrolled.
Table 2.5 State Medicaid Costs Per Capita
Total Costs per enrollee $4106
Current state Contributions $1030
projected state Contributions 
for new enrollees $218
state savings Under Reform $816
Table 2.6: Per Capita TennCare Costs
Per capita Medicaid 
costs at 6.7% inflation
Costs to state at 64% 
FMAP - Current eligibles
Costs to state for newly 
eligibles
2014 $5,322.02 $1,915.93 $0.00 
2015 $5,678.60 $2,044.29 $0.00 
2016 $6,059.06 $2,181.26 $0.00 
2017 $6,465.02 $2,327.41 $323.25 
2018 $6,898.18 $2,483.34 $413.89 
2019 $7,360.35 $2,649.73 $515.22 
2020 $7,853.50 $2,827.26 $785.35
Table 2.7: Enrollment, broken out from Population Parameters
Total 460,100
   Children 
   Adults
69,100 
391,100
      parents 
         Under 80% 
         over 80% 






Children and Parents under 80% 198,130
newly eligible 
Parents over 80% and Childless Adults 261,970
source: statehealthFacts.org 68
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To carry out the calculations, costs per capita were indexed to inflation then mul-
tiplied by the projected number of newly enrolled and newly eligibles, respectively (see 
Table 2.8). Total costs are estimated at $3 billion over five years, from 2014 – 2019. (The 
year 2020 was included in the Table since the federal matching rate will continue to change 
through 2020, but was not included in the cost estimate.) savings and projected net costs 
of $2.3 billion over the five-year period are discussed later. Beyond this estimate, the state 
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Savings
The legislation will also provide savings for the state. For the sake of scope, i focus only 
on the savings that result from changing the public insurance coverage structure, or those 
savings related to the Medicaid Expansion. Additional savings may be seen if inflation is 
altered, if the general health of the population improves, or if the system becomes more 
efficient. Savings may also be seen if the amount of uncompensated care provided by hos-
pitals decreases; the impact of uncompensated care is discussed later.
Drug Rebate Change
TennCare provides coverage for outpatient drugs. The state pays the full sticker price up-
front and is subsequently reimbursed by the pharmaceutical companies. states are allowed 
to negotiate these rates with insurance companies and many states receive reimburse-
ments greater than the 15.1 percent minimum set by CMs. The new legislation raises this 
minimum threshold to raise revenue for the federal costs of the bill; consequently, the 
funds from this increase will be paid to the federal government. some reports indicate that 
Tennessee will lose funds as it hands over its extra rebates; others indicate Tennessee will 
in fact save money from increased rebates. In light of these conflicts, I simply leave the 
impact of these changes at $0.
Program Cuts and Reductions — CoverTN
Tennessee currently operates a subsidized insurance plan called CoverTn that targets 
small businesses and self-employed individuals who are uninsured. in 2014, this demo-
graphic will either be able to enroll in Medicaid or to purchase insurance in a new health 
insurance exchange; many will qualify for federal subsidies for their purchases. As such, 
CoverTn will become a redundant program and can be eliminated. governor Bredesen 
also identified this program for elimination in his cost estimate. Below are estimated sav-
ings based on 2009 CoverTN levels and indexed to a 6.7 percent inflation rate (See Table 
2.9). eliminating this program will save the state $160 million.
Program Cuts and Reductions — AccessTN
Tennessee currently operates a high-risk insurance program called AccessTn to cover 
Tennesseans who cannot obtain insurance because of a pre-existing condition.69 since 
AccessTn is not an entitlement program, Tennessee capped the program in December 2009 
because of budget pressures.70 The state should see significant funding and savings from 
legislation focused on high-risk and often “uninsurable” patients.
First, the bill required the implementation of a high-risk pool by June 1, 2010. 
Tennessee received $97 million in federal funds for the operation of the temporary high-
risk pool required by the health bill.71 over the next four years, Tennessee had the option to 
expand AccessTn or create a new high-risk pool to operate concurrently. Tennessee opted 
to allow the federal government to run the new high-risk pool in the state.72 Requirements 
Table 2.9: CoverTN Elimination
Years
2014 - 2015 
2015 - 2016 
2016 - 2017 







2014 - 2019 ToTAl ($159,088,393)
Table 2.10: AccessTN Elimination
Years
2014 - 2015 
2015 - 2016 
2016 - 2017 







2014 - 2019 ToTAl $226,308,276.86
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for AccessTn are actually more stringent than those required for the new or expanded 
program: AccessTn premiums cannot exceed an age rating of 2:1 such that premiums for 
older members cannot surpass twice the premiums of younger members; premiums that 
meet federal requirements cannot exceed 4:1.73 however, many are concerned that limited 
funds to administer the new plans would leave state-run plans to foot the remainder of the 
bill. This federal program will end at the beginning of 2014 when the health insurance 
exchanges (hie) become operational.
in addition, ppACA requires all plans in an hie to cover all patients, regardless 
of pre-existing conditions. Consequently, Tennessee will have the option to phase-out 
AccessTn and transition enrollees to the health insurance exchange. Before Tennessee 
makes this decision, it should assess the ability of this population to afford insurance 
in the hie with subsidies before ending AccessTn. in my estimate, i assume program 
elimination.
Program Cuts and Reductions — CoverRX
CoverRX is a prescription assistance program that provides medications at affordable co-
pays to those without insurance coverage.74 As the population reaches larger insurance 
rates, need for this program will decline. i use governor Bredesen’s estimate of a savings 
of $6 million for this program.
Increased CHIP Contributions
ppACA includes an increase in federal funding for the Children’s health insurance 
program. Matching rates increase by 23 percent beginning in 2015, raising federal contri-
butions for Chip to 99 percent of costs. savings of $262 million because of a 23 percent-
age point increase in FMAp. 
Net Costs
When these costs and savings are summed, the net costs are $2.3 billion (see Table 2.11). 
Because of the nature of my assumptions, this represents a high-end figure.
Sensitivity Analysis of Parameter Assumptions
Below I carry out several calculations to compare the impact of two factors – inflation and 
enrollment, two factors that face the most variance during bill implementation. in order 
to fully understand the impact of inflation and enrollment rates, I conducted experiments 
to test the strength of each variable. Inflation varies in tests 1 – 3, from 4.7 percent as low 
inflation to 8.7 percent as high inflation; enrollment is held constant. Enrollment varies in 
tests 4 – 6, as a percentage of the full enrollment assumed in the cost estimate. low enroll-
ment is arbitrarily considered to be 33 percent, medium as 66 percent, and high enrollment 
as 100 percent; inflation is held constant (See Table 2.12).
Table 2.11: Net Costs
increase in Coverage + $3 billion
Additional Drug Rebates  
CoverTn elimination 





- $ 159 million 
- $ 97 million 
- $226 million 
- $6 million 
- $262 million
   Net Costs + 2.3 billion
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As expected, decreases in the inflation rate create savings, while increases in infla-
tion increase costs. As a consequence, a 2 percentage point decrease in inflation would save 
the state $363 million over a five-year period. Similarly, a 2 percentage point increase in 
inflation would cost the state an additional $412 million (See Table 2.13).
likewise, changes in enrollment have expected results. enrollment rates, howev-
er, have greater influence over the amount spent on the expansions since enrollment can 
vary to a greater extent than inflation. For every percent change in enrollment, cost would 
change by $30 million (See Table 2.14). These findings are consistent with a recent report 
published in health Affairs that attributed the bulk of increases in Medicaid spending to 
increases in enrollment.75
Indirect Savings: Uncompensated Care
Under the current health system, providers, other patients, and government entities in-
cur the burden for uncompensated care received by uninsured persons. some argue that 
expanding health insurance coverage will correspondingly reduce the amount lost from 
these medical services that are provided to uninsured persons for which they do not pay 
themselves. Theoretically, if everyone who receives medical services has health insurance, 
providers would receive reimbursements for all procedures, hospitals would no longer in-
cur uncompensated care, and governments could reduce payments to hospitals that cover 
these loses.
practically, however, the absence of a uniform and comprehensive data collection 
system limits our ability to accurately demonstrate these savings. A 2007 Comptroller’s 
paper explores federal, state, and local expenses that cover “indigent care” within the state 
Table 2.12: Test Parameters
Inflation Rate Enrollment (% of full enrollment)
1. Test for Decreasing Inflation Rate 4.7% 100%
2. Test for Constant Inflation Rate 6.7% 100%
3. Test for Increasing Inflation Rate 8.7% 100%
4. Test for low enrollment 6.7% 33%
5. Test for Medium enrollment 6.7% 66%
6. Test for high enrollment 6.7% 100%
Table 2.13: Test Results for Inflation
Cost, 2014 - 2019 Difference* Percent difference*
1. Decreased Inflation $2.66 billion -$363 million -12%
2. Constant Inflation $3.02 billion $0 billion 0%
3. Increased Inflation $3.43 billion +$412 million +14%
*from cost estimate
Table 2.14: Test Results for Enrollment
Cost, 2014 - 2019 Difference* Percent difference*
4. low enrollment $1.03 billion -$1.99 billion -66%
5. Medium enrollment $2 billion -$1.2 billion -33%
6. high enrollment $3.02 billion $0 billion 0%
*from cost estimate
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of Tennessee. The difficulties and inaccuracies in determining these exact costs can be 
summarized as two major impediments. First, hospital finances for this purpose are self-
reported and based on a variety of accounting practices. losses based on the gross amounts 
charged to every patient even though only a fraction of these costs are actually reimbursed 
by insurers; an estimation technique is then used to determine actual costs of indigent 
care from these often exaggerated figures. Second, “government expenditures are rarely 
earmarked explicitly for indigent care, though many government programs likely treat in-
dividuals who are indigent.”76 in other words, identifying exact amounts spent on indigent 
care is complicated since few programs solely treat this population. A more complete dis-
cussion is available in that report.
Despite these inaccuracies, i have included a series of tables to approximate and 
identify funds that could be impacted by coming changes in our health system. estimate 
1 provides estimates of losses incurred by Federally Qualified Health Centers, Health 
Departments, and hospitals (see Table 2.15). While the accounting and reporting systems 
differ within each category, this estimate highlights the dramatic revenue streams that each 
organization foregoes in a single year. 
This amount – $562.2 million – offers one incomplete estimate of the amount spent 
in Tennessee on uncompensated care. The estimate, however, fails to include all providers 
and all sources of uncompensated care. physician practices not directly associated with 
hospitals, freestanding clinics that do not receive federal funds, and charity clinics that also 
forego federal funds are excluded from this total.
The Urban institute has also released estimates of uncompensated care that offer a 
more complete estimate of these costs (see Table 2.16).
Without reform, the Urban institute estimates that the amount spent on uncompen-
sated care in Tennessee could double in the next ten years, based on health care inflation 
and an increase in the number of uninsured individuals. Under recent reforms, however, the 
total amount spent will decrease according to its model. Above i copy a table provided by 
Urban institute that comprises these estimates on a national level (see Table 2.17). These 
calculations show an estimated decrease in the amount spent nationally despite accounting 
Table 2.15: Costs of Uncompensated Care in Tennessee – Estimate 1
Publically and Privately Funded Health Providers
Federally Qualified Health 
Centers, 2005
Uncompensated indigent Care 
provided to self-pay patients $23.5 million
Tennessee Rural County 
health Departments, 2006
Uncompensated indigent Care 
provided to self-pay patients $24.2 million
Tennessee Metro County 
health Departments, 2006
Uncompensated indigent Care 
provided to self-pay patients $23.9 million
hospitals, Joint Annual 
Report, 2005
Uncompensated Average Costs 
(not gross Charges) $491 million
Total: $562.2 million
Table 2.16: Costs of Uncompensated Care in Tennessee – Estimate 277
Urban Institute
number of Uninsured 
Tennesseans (2008)
Uncompensated Care Costs 
(per Capita)
Total Uncompensated Care 
Costs for Tennesseans (2008)
900,000 $1,264 $1.13 Billion
Sources: statehealthfacts.org; “The Costs of Failure to Enact Health Reform: Implications for States”, Urban Institute
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for inflation in health care costs. The Tennessee estimate presented in Estimate 3 assumes 
that health reform cuts the number of uninsured Tennesseans in half and projects that $900 
million will be spent on uncompensated care in 2019. This total is compared with projec-
tions assuming no changes in the system in estimate 4 and show net savings of $1.6 billion 
in a single year. 
The savings demonstrated – $1.6 billion – represent savings to service providers. 
in order for the state budget to realize any portion of these savings, the general Assembly 
must directly decrease current allocations, a task which presents fiscal and political dif-
ficulties. As previously mentioned, the budget rarely allocates funds to cover specifically 
uncompensated care; as such, preemptively identifying cuts requires sophisticated guesses. 
And since these funds are not earmarked for these costs, legislators face backlash from af-
fected parties. 
such action is taken in the national reform bill. The federal law initially reduces 
Disproportionate share hospitals (Dsh) payments by 75 percent; subsequent increas-
es will be based on the number of uninsured and the amount of uncompensated care.78 
Tennessee hospitals fortunately will not shoulder these reductions in Dsh payment since 
Tennessee does not receive these allotments per its TennCare waiver. At the same time, 
hospitals should see a reduction in the amount of uncompensated care they provide.
Federal Spending in Tennessee
The nature of the Medicaid program requires state fiscal contributions in order to receive 
federal matching funds. Tennessee will be responsible for finding the additional funds to 
expand this program to the federally-mandated levels. This report would be remiss, how-
ever, if federal contributions were ignored. The table above identifies federal spending 
available to the state under the assumptions used to calculate the costs to the state (see 
Table 2.19). Combined with the state contributions for Medicaid enrollees, health provid-
ers in Tennessee will receive an estimated revenue increase of $13 billion.




Cost per uninsured 
person
Spending on Uncompensated 
care (billions)
nationally
2009 49.1 $1,264 $62.1
2014 34.0 $1,588 $54.0
2019 23.0 $2,026 $46.6
Tennessee
2019 .45 $2,026 $.9
*Note: Reflects Senate bill 
Source: “The Cost of Uncompensated Care with and Without Health Reform,” Urban Institute
Table 2.18: Costs of Uncompensated Care in Tennessee – Estimate 4 - Savings
Urban Institute
no Reform – spending in 2019 With Reform – spending in 2019 savings under Reform
$2.5 billion $.9 billion $1.6 billion
Sources: statehealthfacts.org; “The Costs of Failure to Enact Health Reform: Implications for States,” Urban Institute
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Summary and Findings
in other words, this section serves to clarify a vague cost estimate of $2.3 billion. First, 
the research on characteristics of the population is contradictory at best. enrollment in 
most public programs is relatively low, yet Massachusetts has seen almost full enrollment. 
Moreover, various cultural differences may exist within this population that naturally re-
duce their likelihood of pursuing care or signing up for coverage. Finally, contradictory 
research on this population’s health finds them to have both better and worse health. Taken 
in sum, we can only generalize about the enrollment, usage, and expenses that will be in-
curred from the expansion population.
As such, assumptions were made that assumed full enrollment with a constant high 
inflation rate of 6.7 percent. Costs for five years are estimated at $3 billion. Savings from 
eliminating redundant programs and increased federal funding are estimated at $0.7 bil-
lion, leaving nets costs at approximately $2.3 billion. The severity of impact of enrollment 
is much greater. in other words, most variation in cost will come from the number of people 
who sign up as opposed to from inflation.
Conclusion
From its beginning days through recent cuts, Medicaid and TennCare have grappled with 
health care costs and attempted to balance increased enrollment with the necessary in-
creased costs. This struggle will continue when Medicaid enrollment increase in 2014 but 
will do so in a rapidly changing health care environment. Corresponding changes that 
result from PPACA will create a dynamic market that is difficult to predict. Similarly, 
the fiscal implications to the Tennessee state budget are nearly impossible to accurately 
predict. The figures presented by this paper should not be used as exact sums but rather as 
starting points. 
As health and human services unveils more details on reform implementation, 
Tennessee should remain responsive to changes. During the first years of the new changes, 
Tennessee would be well served to collect as much data as fiscally and feasibly possible in 
order to uncover trends that will aid in planning.
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